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New York Third Party Bad Faith: Is It A
Plaintiff's Dream Or A Defendant's
Nightmare?
Honorable Joan B. Lefkowitzt
I. Introduction
New York is often perceived as a jurisdiction where innova-
tive precedents are set; however, such is not the case in the area
of insurer bad faith.1 To the contrary, New York has been slow
in providing clear definitions of what evidences bad faith2 and
t Supreme Court Justice, Ninth Judicial District, presently presiding at an 1AS
Part in Rockland County. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable research and
organizational assistance of Gerianne Hannibal, a Pace Law School 1992 graduate. Simi-
larly, the review and commentary advice of the Judge's law secretary, James Fine, is
acknowledged. Nevertheless, the views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. A "third-party" bad faith cause of action may arise when an insurer fails to settle
a third-party liability claim brought against its insured for an amount within the policy
limits and a verdict in excess of the limits is thereafter obtained, thereby exposing the
insured to liability for the excess amount. Roldan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 149 A.D.2d 20, 29,
544 N.Y.S.2d 359, '361 (2d Dep't 1989). N.Y. INs. LAW § 2601, the Unfair Claim Settle-
ment Practices statute, requires that insurers attempt "in good faith to effectuate
prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims submitted in which liability has become
reasonably clear .. . " Id. at § 2601(a)(4). See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
Allegations that often accompany the failure to settle allegation include, among other
things, the insurer's failure to investigate, failure to inform the insured of a compromise
offer, and failure to induce the insured to contribute. Oppel v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 517
F. Supp. 1305, 1306 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
A first-party bad faith claim is brought by an insured who "seeks to recover a claim
for coverage under its own insurance policy." Samovar of Russia Jewelry Antique Corp.
v. Generali, 102 A.D.2d 279, 280, 476 N.Y.S.2d 869, 871 (1st Dep't 1984). New York's
standard of third-party bad faith liability as set forth in Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 942 (1972),
"does not apply to an action involving a first party claim by an insured against its own
insurer." Samovar, 102 A.D.2d at 280, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 871. First-party bad faith is be-
yond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of first-party bad faith, see Phyllis
Savage, Note, The Availability of Excess Damages for Wrongful Refusal to Honor First
Party Insurance Claims-An Emerging Trend, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 164 (1976). Third-
party bad faith in the context of excess insurers versus primary insurers is also beyond
the scope of this Comment.
2. DiBlasi v. Aetna Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 147 A.D.2d 93, 98-99, 542 N.Y.S.2d 187,
191 (2d Dep't 1989). See also Knobloch v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 38 N.Y.2d 471, 476, 344
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what measure of damages is applicable3 once bad faith has been
proven. Consequently, in many instances New York insurers
have escaped punishment for bad faith conduct. Given the inex-
orable increase in the size of personal injury verdicts4 and the
absence of a concomitant increase in the amount of automobile
liability coverage5 that people carry,6 the time is ripe for New
York to adopt bad faith standards for liability and damages that
promote fair compensation for accident victims and provide real
protection for premium-paying insureds - standards that are
applied in many jurisdictions throughout this country.
Consumers buy liability insurance7 primarily with one pur-
N.E.2d 364, 367, 381 N.Y.S.2d 433, 436 (1976). In charging the jury, the Knobloch judge
advised that "we do not have any specific definition in our law as to what indicates or
evidences bad faith." Id. The Court of Appeals chose not to rule on the accuracy of the
charge because no exception to it had been taken; the court ruled only that the trial
record contained evidence sufficient to sustain the bad faith verdict. Id. For discussion of
Knobloch, see infra text accompanying notes 59-62.
3. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 440, 285 N.E.2d 849, 856, 334
N.Y.S.2d 601, 611, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 942 (1972) (Fuld, J., concurring).
4. Michael Hoenig, Random Thoughts on Damage Issues, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 9, 1991, at
3, col. 1. Mr. Hoenig's article cites recent multi-million dollar verdicts including a $22.9
million verdict awarded by a Queens jury to a twenty-six-year-old motorcyclist who suf-
fered paraplegic injuries and a $20.7 million verdict awarded by a Bronx jury to a dia-
betic automobile accident victim who lost his leg, fractured his elbow and shoulder, and
sustained shoulder nerve damage. Id. See also 1991's Largest Verdicts, NATIONAL L.J.,
Jan. 20, 1992, at S14-15 (citing $25.6 million verdict awarded by a Bronx jury to the wife
and three children of a Clairol executive killed in a head-on collision). In Ecks v. Nizen,
Supreme Court Rockland County, Index No. 74 20/85, a motor vehicle accident case in
which the plaintiff suffered brain damage and was rendered quadriplegic, a jury verdict
was returned before the author on October 17, 1991, in the total sum of $46,804,530, of
which $44,000,000 was awarded for future medical expenses. An excellent summary of
the facts and relevant testimony is set forth in IX THE NEw YORK JURY VERDICT RE-
PORTER, Issue 18, Nov. 1991.
5. Abusive insurance claim settlement practices were not countenanced by the
courts until automobile liability insurance was created and automobile liability claims
became prevalent. The cause of action for bad faith was developed in the mid-twentieth
century to combat unscrupulous automobile insurer claims handling conduct. STEPHEN S.
ASHLEY. BAD FAITH ACTIONS LIABIIrrY AND DAMAGES § 1:01 (Supp. 1991).
6. New York State law requires automobile owners to carry automobile liability in-
surance to cover bodily injury and property damage claims brought against them. N.Y.
VEH. & TRAP. LAw § 311(4)(a) (McKinney 1986). The minimal policy limits permitted are
$10,000 per person and $20,000 per occurrence for bodily injury and $5,000 per occur-
rence for property damage. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 60.1(a) (rev. 1988).
These minimum limits have not been changed in thirty-four years. Sam H. Verhovek,
Bill Would Raise Minimum For Car Insurance Liability, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1990, at
25, col. 1.
7. A liability insurance policy "promises to indemnify the insured against the risk of
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/2
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pose in mind, protection for negligence claims brought against
them8 in the event they accidentally injure someone or damage
his or her property. Insureds pay more in premiums than the
insurer pays out in liability claims on their behalf. When a lia-
bility claim is presented, insureds have the absolute right to ex-
pect that the insurer will negotiate settlement of the claim with
the protection of the insured's financial interest in mind.9 They
should be able to reasonably expect that the insurer will take no
action that will burden them "with the crippling jeopardy of
a[n] excess judgment.""0
Many would argue, however, that liability insurers have
never had the protection of their insureds foremost in mind
when presented with liability claims. In previous decades, keep-
ing insurers in line was a task performed by regulators. Today,
however, although insurance is still a regulated industry, "virtu-
ally every state is undermanned and underfunded with respect
to the policing of insurance companies and has barely sufficient
resources to enable only a cursory processing of new policy infor-
mation and rate increase requests." '11 Thus, the policing of liabil-
ity claims is almost nonexistent.
Insureds who are put at financial risk as a result of action or
inaction by their insurers can no longer rely on regulators. In-
stead, the insured must look to the insurer directly,12 by bring-
liability he may incur to third parties." ASHLEY, supra note 5, at § 1:06.
8. Dennis E. Murray & Kirk J. Delli Bovi, Prosecuting Bad Faith Claims, in PROSE-
CUTING AND DEFENDING INSURANCE CLAIMS 439, 443, 445 (Robert F. Cushman et al. 1989).
9. Thomas J. Scannell, Comment, Excess Liability of Insurers for Bad Faith Re-
fusal to Settle: A Boon to the Individual Insured that Works to the Detriment of Con-
sumers, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 377, 382 (1984). See also Guarantee Ins. Co. v. City of
Long Beach, 106 A.D.2d 428, 482 N.Y.S.2d 522 (2d Dep't 1984) (ruling that insurer
"must exercise good faith and fair dealing when [engaging) in settlement negotiations of
liability claims) (citing Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 334 N.E.2d
849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 60, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1972)).
10. Henegan v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 31 A.D.2d 12, 13, 294 N.Y.S.2d 547, 548
(1st Dep't 1968).
11. Murray & Deli Bovi, supra note 8, at 442.
12. Generally, an insured who faces an excess judgment and believes his insurer
failed to settle the liability action against him in good faith, assigns his claim to the
plaintiff in that liability action, who then initiates a bad faith cause of action against the
insurer. ROBERT H JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 125 (1987). The insured is
amenable to assignment because he would prefer not to "bear the risks and costs of [bad
faith] litigation only to forfeit any award." Moutsopoulos v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 607
F.2d 1185, 1189 (7th Cir. 1979). The plaintiff in the underlying tort action is amenable to
1992]
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ing a bad faith claim. It may be argued that bad faith awards,
which force insurers to pay the entire liability judgment, even
one in excess of the insured's liability limits,13 may be the only
way to deter insurer misconduct and fill the gaps created by reg-
ulatory oversight.14
The author has presided as a State Supreme Court Justice,
Ninth Judicial District, for nearly twenty three months (as of
November 1992) and in that period has conferenced hundreds of
negligence personal injury cases and has presided over dozens of
such trials. The author has found that insurers and the defense
bar almost uniformly have worked with plaintiff's counsel and
the court in arriving at satisfactory monetary resolutions of the
controversies. In virtually every case with which this author has
been involved, the interests of the insured were more than ade-
quately protected and of paramount concern to the insurer.
However, in a distinct minority of situations, less than a
handful, it was this author's belief that if the case were to pro-
ceed to trial the insured would be exposed to liability in excess
of the insurance coverage. Thus, the case was ripe for settlement
at a figure within policy limits. When the insurer declined to set-
assignment because he is not in privity of contract with the insurer, and thus in most
states, including New York, cannot sue the insurer without the assignment. CLINTON E.
MnLLER, How INSURANCE COMPANIES SETrLE CASES § 1503 (rev. Nov. 1990). See also Op-
pel v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (ruling that assign-
ment of bad faith claims is permissible under New York law). But see Scannell, supra
note 9, at 387-89, for discussion of minority jurisdictions that allow accident victims to
proceed directly against the insurer without an assignment
Generally, the attorney who represented the accident victim in the underlying action
will represent him or her in the subsequent bad faith action. But see Zweig v. Safeco Ins.
Co. of Am., 125 A.D.2d 205, 509 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1st Dep't 1986) (granting insurer's motion
to disqualify plaintiff's counsel from conducting bad faith trial because he was alleged to
have prevented any realistic opportunity to settle the liability claim and would likely be
called by insurer as a witness at trial).
Critics of assignments claim they make "silk purses" out of "sows' ears," because the
plaintiff in the underlying action obtains the opportunity to recover the entire judgment
from the bad faith insurer when he never could have recovered it from an insured of
modest means. Gray v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1128, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Critics have also claimed, unsuccessfully, that assignments are a collusive way to
gain diversity and invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts in cases in which the
insured and his insurer are residents of one state but the accident victim is a resident of
another state. See, e.g., DiLallo v. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N.Y., 355 F. Supp. 519, 521
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
13. DiBlasi, 147 A.D.2d at 94, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 188-89.
14. Murray & Delli Bovi, supra note 8, at 442.
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tle, the conclusion that the insured's interests were not being ad-
equately protected was inescapable. These few instances pro-
voked lively discussion with colleagues and the bar, and was the
impetus for this article.
Section I herein discusses the various bad faith rules with
regard to liability and damages. Section II provides a look at the
status of bad faith in New York today. Section III concludes
that New York should adopt rules that hold insurers to a negli-
gence standard with regard to liability for bad faith and that
subject them to the judgment rule with regard to damages for
bad faith regardless of the insured's solvency.
II. How Other States Handle Bad Faith
A. Standards for Bad Faith Liability
1. Negligence Standard
It is clear that all insurers owe their insureds a duty to use
some kind of care and skill in considering the insured's interests
when making decisions on how to manage liability claims.15 Be-.
cause an insurer has complete control in responding to settle-
ment offers within policy limits,16 and is a professional in the
claims business bound to perform with skill and diligence, some
jurisdictions hold the insurer liable in bad faith for a negligent
breach of its duty.'
15. STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH LIAILITY: A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW 10 (1987).
16. Kulak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 47 A.D.2d 418, 419, 366 N.Y.S.2d 927, 928
(4th Dep't 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 140, 351 N.E.2d 735, 386 N.Y.S.2d
87 (1976).
17. JOHN APPLEMAN, 7C APPLEMAN'S INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4713 (Berdal
ed. 1979). E.g., Home Ins. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 385 S.E.2d 736, 741 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989) (reiterating that under Georgia law, "recovery is permitted for a negligent refusal
to settle"); Surdyka v. DeWitt, 784 P.2d 819, 822 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied,
(Dec. 18, 1989) (affirming trial court's use of the negligence standard for bad faith liabil-
ity after insurer denied claim); Spray v. Continental Cas. Co., 739 P.2d 40, 42 (Or. Ct.
App.), review denied, 743 P.2d 735 (Or. 1987) (affirming jury verdict of bad faith for
insurer's negligence in failing to attempt to settle wrongful death claim); McNally v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying Delaware law) (noting
that insurer must act like a "reasonable and prudent man with the obligation to pay all
of the recoverable damages"); Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guin, 723 S.W.2d 656, 659
(Tax. 1987) (affirming jury verdict of bad faith because insurer, in handling claims, failed
to exercise "that degree of care and diligence which an ordinary prudent person would
exercise in the management of his own business"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co.,
1992]
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Consequently, if an insurer fails to settle a liability claim
within policy limits through a lack of due care, it can then be
held liable for an entire tort judgment in excess of the insured's
policy limits.18 The negligence standard requires "the factfinder
to determine whether a person of ordinary prudence, in the ex-
ercise of that degree of care which such a person would use in
the management of his affairs, would have accepted the settle-
ment offer."' 9 Critics of the negligence standard claim that it pe-
nalizes insurers for failing to predict correctly the outcome of
the accident victim's action or for making a mistake of
judgment.2
Insurers are experienced enough to know that at trial a jury
can react to many different factors. Jurors are human beings
who bring their own life experiences and prejudices into a court-
room. Many well prepared attorneys who thought they selected
the best jury for their case, and who presented a solid case, have
been astounded by jury verdicts. If a set of facts can be inter-
preted two ways, and if interpretation against the insurer, for
instance because of extensive injuries, would mean a verdict be-
yond policy limits, it is advisable for the insurer to offer to settle
within policy limits.
The insurer is usually protected from a greedy plaintiff's
bad faith action by stating on the record that it has offered the
policy and the plaintiff has refused to accept it. The insurer is
seemingly not adequately protected if it offers the policy after a
judgment in favor of the injured plaintiff at the liability phase of
the bifurcated trial, because it is highly unlikely that the plain-
tiff's lawyer would be interested in settling the case at that
point. In permitting the case to go that far, absent a serious
question on liability prior to verdict, it may be argued that the
insurer did not have the best interests of the insured at heart.
Juries are unpredictable and an insurer should be penalized for
not recognizing that fact and for making a mistake in judgment.
373 A.2d 339, 340 (N.H. 1977) (reiterating state precedent that "insurer owes a duty to
its insured to exercise due care in defending and settling claims against the insured").
18. Spray, 739 P.2d at 42. According to APPLEMAN, courts adopting the negligence
standard "have applied the reasonable and prudent man test" for determining whether
liability for failure to settle exists. APPLEMAN, supra note 17, at § 4713.
19. ASHLEY, supra note 15.
20. Id. at 12.
[Vol. 12:543
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Often there is no legally sufficient basis for a judge to set aside a
jury verdict on liability, at which point the insurer's failure to
settle appropriately has placed it in a most tenuous position.
2. Dishonesty Standard
Some jurisdictions have rejected the negligence standard for
bad faith liability and have instead embraced one that is more
rigorous, namely the "dishonesty" standard." The "dishonesty"
standard requires that for liability to be imposed on an insurer,
its conduct must have manifested "a dishonest purpose, moral
obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, [or a] breach of a known duty
through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature
of fraud. '22
3. Recklessness Standard
At least one court examining both the negligence standard
and the dishonesty standard opted for a compromise. In Com-
mercial Union Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,23 the
Supreme Court of Michigan reasoned that "bad faith should not
be used interchangeably with either negligence or fraud."'24 In-
stead, the Michigan court ruled that to be liable, an insurer
must have engaged in conduct that was "arbitrary, reckless, [or]
indifferent" 25 to the interests of the insured.
4. "Disregard the Limits" Standard
Some jurisdictions have embraced a standard for bad faith
liability known as the "disregard the limits" standard. This
standard is applied by asking whether a prudent insurer would
have responded favorably to an offer if the policy limits had ei-
ther exceeded the amount claimed, or been unlimited. 8 If the
21. ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 117 (1987).
22. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 404 N.E.2d 759, 762 (Ohio 1980)
(quoting Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 187 N.E.2d 45, 48 (1962)). See also Stevenson
v. Union Std. Ins. Co., 746 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Ark. 1988) (requiring insurer conduct that is
dishonest, malicious, or oppressive for bad faith cause of action to stand).
23. 393 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. 1986).
24. Commercial Union, 393 N.W.2d at 164.
25. Id.
26. Richard D. Williams and Howard Wollitz, Emerging Trends in Bad Faith Liti-
1992]
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answer is yes, and the insurer failed to accept the settlement
offer within the policy limits, then bad faith is demonstrated.2 7
5. Statutory Violations
A few courts have construed their states' unfair claims han-
dling statutes to authorize private bad faith causes of action by
insureds or accident victims."8 California had been one such
state until 1988, when the Supreme Court. overruled a ten-year
precedent in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 2 1
and determined that no private cause of action in favor of either
insureds or accident victims exists under the California Unfair
Claim Practices Act. 0
The Moradi court listed a myriad of reasons to justify the
rejection of its landmark decision in Royal Globe Insurance Co.
v. Superior Court31 a decade earlier. For instance, it surveyed
nineteen 2 jurisdictions that had also considered the issue, not-
ing that seventeen had refused to authorize private causes of ac-
tion.s Additionally, it reconsidered the California Unfair Claim
Practices statute's legislative history, and concluded that "the
Legislature [had] never intended to create such a right of ac-
tion. 3 4 Instead, the statute had been created to provide for ad-
gation, in PROSECUTING AND DEFENDING INSURANCE CLAIMs 465, 471 (Robert F. Cushman
et al. eds. 1989). See also Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 264
(Miss. 1988).
27. Professor Keeton described the rule as requiring the insurer to "view the situa-
tion as it would if there were no policy limit applicable to the claim." Robert E. Keeton,
Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. Rav. 1136, 1148
(1954), cited in Brown v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 314 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir.
1963). A thorough discussion of the "disregard the limits" standard can be found in
ASHLEY, supra note 15, at 39-41.
28. E.g., Lough v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 789 P.2d 576 (Mont. 1990); Robinson v.
Continental Cas. Co., 406 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1991).
29. 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988), rev'g Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d
329 (Cal. 1979).
30. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West Supp. 1992).
31. 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979).
32. The Moradi decision did not mention Alaska, which only a month earlier had
pronounced in O.K. Lumber Co. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523 (Alaska
1988), that it would not recognize a private cause of action for breach of that state's
unfair claims practices statute. O.K. Lumber also provides a list of jurisdictions analyz-
ing the private cause of action issue. Id. at 527 n.6.
33. Moradi, 758 P.2d at 63.
34. Id. at 65. For a discussion of Royal Globe and Moradi, see Hon. H. Walter Cros-
[Vol. 12:543
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ministrative regulation and discipline of insurers found guilty of
unfair claims practices with such frequency as to indicate a gen-
eral business practice.3 6
Interestingly, the Moradi court omitted Massachusetts from
its list of jurisdictions addressing the issue of whether their
states' unfair claims handling statutes create a private cause of
action. Five years earlier, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts36
had authorized private causes of action under the consumer pro-
tection statute3 7 for violations of that state's unfair claim settle-
ment practices. 38
B. Measure of Bad Faith Damages
1. The Judgment Rule - Awarding the Excess Judgment
Without Regard to the Insured's Solvency
Fourteen states hold that once an insurer has refused the
opportunity to settle a liability claim against its insured within
policy limits, and a verdict above policy limits is then reached,
entry of the judgment "alone is sufficient damage to sustain a
recovery from [the] insurer for its [bad faith]" without regard to
the insured's financial ability to pay the judgment.39 The mea-
sure of damages awarded in such a case is the amount by which
key, Bad Faith in California: Its History, Development and Current Status, 26 TORT &
INS. L.J. 561, 581-88 (1991).
35. Moradi, 758 P.2d at 62.
36. Van Dyke v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 357, 360 (Mass.
1983); DiMarzo v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 449 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (Mass. 1983). See also
Milazzo v. Sentry Ins., 691 F. Supp. 517 (D. Mass. 1987), affd, 856 F.2d 321 (1st Cir.
1988) (acknowledging accident victim's right to sue for violation of statute but granting
insurer's summary judgment motion because it had not wrongfully refused to settle or
defend case).
37. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 93A, § 1-11 (1991).
38. MAsS. GEN. L. ch. 176D, § 3(9) (1991). For more extensive discussion of the Van
Dyke and DiMarzo decisions, see Scannell, supra note 9, at 379, 390-91.
39. Gray v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1128, 1131 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Gray construed North Carolina law, thus becoming the fourteenth jurisdiction to adopt
the judgment rule in every bad faith case. See also Crabb v. National Indem. Co., 205
N.W.2d 633 (S.D. 1973) (affirming bench verdict that insurer owed the excess judgment
even though insured was judgment proof). See also Annotation, Insured's Payment of
Excess Judgment, or a Portion Thereof, as Prerequisite of Recovery Against Liability
Insurer for Wrongful Failure to Settle Claim Against Insured, 63 A.LL 3D 627, 641-69
(1975) for list of jurisdictions.
1992]
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the verdict exceeds the policy limits.4" Put another way, dam-
ages are a fixed sum, a mathematical calculation that equals the
difference between the insurance coverage and the jury verdict
against the insured in the underlying case.41 Whether the in-
sured has satisfied or is able to satisfy the judgment is
irrelevant.
2. The Payment Rule
The payment rule, which is "now generally discredited, ' '42
holds "that if an insured did not and cannot pay out any money
in satisfaction of an excess judgment, the insured was not
harmed, and, therefore, the insurer is not to be held responsible
for its bad faith. ' 43 Put another way, under the payment rule,
"damages are deemed to equal the judgment only to the extent
the insured has satisfied or is able to satisfy the judgment."'44
3. The Hybrid Rule
Most states apply a hybrid rule, which is a compromise be-
tween the judgment and payment doctrines.45 The hybrid rule
rejects the payment rule to the extent that it requires actual
prepayment of the judgment, or at least the ability to pay,
before bringing a bad faith claim, but retains it "by precluding
collection on the judgment from the insurer beyond what is or
would actually be collectable from the insured."46 Thus, insureds
who are insolvent and unable to pay a penny of the excess judg-
ment are considered not to have been damaged by the insurer's
40. Purdy v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
41. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schlossberg, 570 A.2d 328, 337 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App.), cert. denied, 577 A.2d 50 (Md. 1990). Interest and costs are also recoverable. Id.
42. Levantino v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 102 Misc. 2d 77, 81, 422 N.Y.S.2d 995, 999
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); Hernandez v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 464 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Tex.
1971) (stating "[vlirtually everything that has been written on this subject in the past
fifteen years has favored the judgment rule over the prepayment rule.").
43. Carter v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co., 423 N.E.2d 188, 191 (Ohio 1981).
44. Murray & Dell Bovi, supra note 8, at 442.
45. This rule had early endorsement from Professor Keeton of Harvard Law School.
See Robert E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1136 (1954).
46. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 447 N.W.2d 691, 709 (Mich. 1989) (Levin,
J., dissenting), later adopted in Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keeley, 461 N.W.2d 666
(Mich. 1990).
[Vol. 12:543
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failure to settle.'7 Consequently, no bad faith damages can be
awarded. In other words, the amount of bad faith damages
awarded depends on the solvency of the insured. The hybrid
rule has become popular because, according to its advocates, it
provides a more reasonable measure of damages than the judg-
ment rule, referred to by some as punitive in nature. 8
II. How New York Handles Bad Faith Claims
A. The Standard for Liability
1. Common Law Standard
New York has rejected the negligence standard for bad faith
liability.49 Three years ago in Roldan v. Allstate Insurance Co.,50
the Second Department reiterated a sixty-year-old precedent
that "a plaintiff must show more than mere negligence on the
part of the insurer' 51 to support a bad faith action.52
The standard that New York ostensibly applies is strict and
was set forth in the 1972 landmark case of Gordon v. Nation-
wide Mutual Insurance Co.53 In Gordon, the Court of Appeals
47. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 440, 285 N.E.2d 849, 856,
334 N.Y.S.2d 610, 611 (Fuld, J., concurring).
48. "If the [insurer] were to be obliged to pay more than the insured was capable of
paying .... the [insurer] ... would be charged punitive damages." Gray, 871 F.2d 1128
(citing Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 440, 285 N.E.2d 849, 856, 334
N.Y.S.2d 610, 611 (1972) (Fuld, J., concurring)). See also All State Vehicles v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 444, 447 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (describing measure of damages in bad
faith claim as punitive in nature).
49. Brown v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 314 F.2d 675, 677-78 (2d Cir. 1963)
(construing New York law). According to Brown, "negligence alone is insufficient to
render the insurer liable, [but] serious and recurrent negligence may be indicative of bad
faith." Brown, 314 F.2d at 680.
50. 149 A.D.2d 20, 544 N.Y.S.2d 359 (2d Dep't 1989).
51. Id. at 37, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 369 (citing Best Bldg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur.
Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928)).
52. See, e.g., Shumaiski v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 80 A.D.2d 975, 976, 438
N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 671, 425 N.E.2d 897, 442 N.Y.S.2d 508
(1981) (granting insurer's summary judgment motion to dismiss bad faith claim after
plaintiff failed to list in her bill of particulars those actions by the insurer constituting
more than mere negligence). One New York court explained that to apply the negligence
standard would be to punish an insurer merely for taking a position that "is arguably
correct at the time, [but] ultimately shown to be incorrect." Orion Ins. Co. v. General
Electric Co., 129 Misc. 2d 466, 474, 493 N.Y.S.2d 397, 403 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 1985).
53. 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d 849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 942
(1972); see, e.g., Crawford v. Hospital of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, 159
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was faced with a claim of bad faith after a verdict of almost
$260,000 was reached following the insurer's refusal to defend
liability claims and settle within the $20,000 policy limits." The
insurer alleged the policy had been canceled prior to the loss. It
was ultimately determined that the policy had been improperly
canceled and the insurer should have defended the claims. In
ruling that no bad faith had been demonstrated, the court
stated, "bad faith requires an extraordinary showing of a disin-
genuous or dishonest failure to carry out [the insurance]
contract."55
Despite the precedent established in Gordon, it is arguable
that the courts are, in practice, applying a liability standard that
is far less rigorous. For instance, in Peterson v. Allcity Insur-
ance Co.,"' a Second Circuit case decided six months after
Gordon, the court defined bad faith as the insurer's failure to
"give at least equal consideration to the insured's interests as to
its own when making settlement decisions. ' '5 7
The Peterson court affirmed a finding of bad faith in a case
that arose out of an accident in which the insured drove over a
divider and collided with an oncoming car. The accident left the
insured's passenger partially blinded. The insured's liability pol-
icy limit was $10,000 and the jury verdict was $80,000. The in-
surer had refused to settle for the $10,000 limits because it con-
tended the passenger was contributorily negligent "in accepting
a ride with a driver she had reason to believe was intoxicated."5 8
A.D.2d 304, 305, 552 N.Y.S.2d 582, 584 (1st Dep't 1990).
54. Id. at 431, 285 N.E.2d at 850, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
55. Id. at 438, 285 N.E.2d at 855, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 609. See also Dawn Frosted
Meats, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 99 A.D.2d 448, 470 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1st Dep't),
a/I'd, 62 N.Y.2d 895, 467 N.E.2d 531, 478 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1984). Seven years before
Gordon, the Fourth Department reinstated a bad faith complaint and granted the plain-
tiff a new bad faith trial because the trial court had erroneously charged as bad faith
elements "a sinister motive - guilty knowledge - an intent to do harm or deprive an-
other of his just rights and property - a willful refusal to carry out an obligation with
intent to injure - the deliberate doing of something the actor knows to be wrong."
Cappano v. Phoenix Assur. Co. of N.Y., 28 A.D.2d 639, 640, 280 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (4th
Dep't 1967).
56. 472 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1972).
57. Id. at 77.
58. Id. at 77. Prior to the advent of comparative negligence in New York in 1975
(C.P.L.R. § 1411), if the plaintiff was guilty of any negligence, his complaint was dis.
missed. 1 NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CrivL 2:35 (2d ed. 1986).
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Instead, it had offered $1,000 when the case reached the trial
calendar, and $5,000 after jury selection.
Four years later, in Knobloch v. Royal Globe Insurance
Co.,59 another insured with a $10,000 policy lost control of his
car, injuring his passenger. 0 The insurer, aware that the passen-
ger was hospitalized for three weeks, wanted to save money on
the policy, and refused to offer more than $9,500 until the day
before trial, when it offered the full $10,000, which was then re-
jected by the passenger. The jury awarded the passenger
$75,383.50.61
After paying the excess judgment, the insured instituted a
bad faith action against the insurer. At trial, the judge's charge
to the jury on liability utilized the Peterson court's language.
Because no exception to the charge was taken, the Court of Ap-
peals did not address its sufficiency, and ruled only that the evi-
dence was sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of bad faith. 2
Almost a decade after Knobloch, the liability standard again
seemed less stringent than required under Gordon. In State v.
Merchants Insurance Co. of New Hampshire,e5 the Third De-
partment was presented with a bad faith case arising out of an
accident in which a State-owned vehicle crossed the center line
and collided with a pick-up truck, killing the truck driver, a
thirty-five-year-old wife and mother of two who worked outside
the home. Despite a settlement demand for $90,000, which was
later reduced to $75,000, the State's insurer offered only $45,000
of the $100,000 policy. Trial resulted in a verdict of $180,000.
Subsequently, in an action for bad faith refusal to settle, the
plaintiff recovered judgment for the excess.
In affirming the bad faith jury verdict, the Appellate Divi-
sion held:
[D]efendant was well aware that its proposed $45,000 settlement
figure was substantially lower than the liability it could reasona-
bly expect to incur. The jury could reasonably have reached the
59. 38 N.Y.2d 471, 344 N.E.2d 364, 381 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1976).
60. Id. at 474-75, 344 N.E.2d at 366, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 434-35.
61. Id. at 478, 344 NXE.2d at 368, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
62. Id. at 480, 344 N.E.2d at 369, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 438. The court expressly rejected
the insurer's argument that tender of the policy limits on the eve of trial insulated it
from bad faith liability. Id. at 478, 344 N.E.2d at 368, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
63. 109 A.D.2d 935, 486 N.Y.S.2d 412 (3d Dep't 1985).
1992]
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conclusion that defendant exercised bad faith in failing to protect
the interest of its insured by coming forth with a reasonable and
fair settlement offer, as it was contractually and statutorily re-
quired to do.6'
In DiBlasi v. Aetna Life and Casualty Insurance Co.,65 the Ap-
pellate Division, Second Department, without discussion of the
Gordon liability standard, ruled that an insurer was liable for
bad faith "only if the decision not to settle within the policy
limits was made . . . in gross disregard of its insured's
interests." 66
The allegation of bad faith in DiBlasi arose out of an acci-
dent in which the insured's vehicle crossed the double yellow
line and struck another vehicle. The insured vehicle's passenger
sustained a dislocation and fracture of the elbow, which brought
on post-traumatic arthritis. The passenger offered to settle the
liability claim for $23,000 of the insured's $25,000 policy limit,
but the insurer refused to pay more than $17,500. The jury ver-
dict for the passenger was $42,000.
In refusing to grant the insurer's motion for summary judg-
ment on the issue of bad faith liability, the DiBlasi court found
that "a reasonably prudent insurance adjuster and/or defense
attorney must have realized that since DiBlasi, who was 22 years
old at the time of the accident, sustained an indisputably pain-
ful, permanent and progressive injury to the right elbow, it was
'highly probable' that the verdict would be in excess of
$25,000. ' '67
Less than two months later, in Roldan v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,68 the Second Department described the bad faith liability
standard as requiring "the rejection by the insurer of an offer of
settlement within its policy limits [that] constitute[s] a deliber-
ate, or at least reckless, decision to disregard the interests of its
insured."69
New York's Pattern Jury Instructions 4:67 lend some guid-
64. Id. at 936, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 413 (citing Kulak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 40
N.Y.2d 140, 351 N.E.2d 735, 386 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1976)).
65. 147 A.D.2d 93, 542 N.Y.S.2d 187 (2d Dep't 1989).
66. Id. at 99, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
67. Id. at 98, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
68. 149 A.D.2d 20, 544 N.Y.S.2d 359 (2d Dep't 1989).
69. Id. at 37, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 370 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 12:543
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/2
NEW YORK THIRD PARTY BAD FAITH
ance in clarifying the current standard of liability for insurer
bad faith, but fall far short of being definitive. According to PJI
4:67, an insurer cannot be held liable for bad faith due to an
"error of judgment" or a "failure . . . to exercise reasonable
care. 0 To be culpable, however, the insurer need not "have ac-
ted maliciously or dishonestly . ... It is enough that it acted
intentionally and in gross disregard of [the insured's] inter-
ests.171 Of significance is the PJI 4:67 caveat, which authorizes a
judge to charge that to be culpable, it is enough that the insurer
acted "intentionally and unfairly disregarded" the insured's in-
terests, if that judge believes the "gross disregard" language is
too strong.72
2. Statutory Standard
New York Insurance Law section 2601 defines "unfair claim
settlement practices" and requires insurers to attempt "in good
faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of
claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear.
.,,)3 Another provision of the New York Insurance Law autho-
rizes a monetary penalty of $500.00 for each violation.7
New York courts have refused to entertain private causes of
action for violations of section 2601. In Cohen v. New York
Property Insurance Underwriting Association,7 5 the First De-
partment ruled that section 2601 "does not create a private right
of action but rather affords a public right of redress by the In-
surance Department . . .,. In other words, violations are
70. 2 NEW YORK PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL 4:67 (Supp. 1992). The in-
struction also lists factors to be considered by the jury in deciding whether bad faith
occurred in the underlying case, including. the probability of a plaintiff's verdict on lia-
bility, the probability of an excess verdict due to the severity of the injuries, and whether
there had been any attempts by the insurer to settle the claim and if so, at what point
such attempts were made.
71. Id.
72. Id. In the Comment following PJI 4:67, the authors took the phrase "grossly
disregarded" from Gordon, a case that they interpreted to concern "bad faith in refusal
to defend rather than in failure to settle ... ." Id. at 348. The authors believe that "gross
disregard" may be too strong a term for failure to settle cases. Id.
73. N.Y. INs. LAW § 2601(a)(4) (McKinney 1985).
74. N.Y. INs. LAW § 109(c)(1), § 2601(c) (McKinney 1985).
75. 65 A.D.2d 71, 410 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1st Dep't 1978).
76. Id. at 79, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
19921
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"within the province and jurisdiction of the State Superinten-
dent of Insurance ' ' 7 and do not give rise to private bad faith
claims, because they are labelled as wrongs against the public at
large.78 Both the Second and Fourth Departments have adopted
the First Department's position and have refused to authorize a
private cause of action brought pursuant to section 2601.79
Despite its rejection of private causes of action that are
based on section 2601 violations, the First Department recently
identified a role that section 2601 violations can play in common
law bad faith actions. In Belco Petroleum Corp. v. AIG Oil Rig,
Inc.,80 the First Department suggested that insureds use evi-
dence of section 2601 violations to press claims for punitive
damages, as follows: "Now, an insured aggrieved by an unfair
claim settlement practice can take his grievance to the Superin-
tendent of Insurance; if the grievance has merit, the Superinten-
dent will presumably take it up and investigate; the insured, be
he of modest means or substantial, should then be able to use
the results of that investigation in pressing a claim for punitive
damages.821
B. Measure of Damages in New York Bad Faith Claims
Twenty-four years ago, New York adopted the rule that an
insured can bring a bad faith claim against his insurer before
paying an excess judgment. In Henegan v. Merchants Mutual
Insurance Co.,8 2 the First Department unanimously reversed
nisi prius and ruled that it would "join with the majority of ju-
risdictions in this country in concluding that an insured is dam-
aged, that he has suffered a loss or injury, upon entry of the
77. Id. (quoting Frizzy Hairstylists, Inc. v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 93 Misc. 2d 59, 403
N.Y.S.2d 389 (App. Term 2d & 11th Jud. Dists. 1977)).
78. Roldan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 149 A.D.2d 20, 43, 544 N.Y.S.2d 359, 374 (2d Dep't
1989).
79. Rein Monroe Ass'n v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 175 A.D.2d 582, 572 N.Y.S.2d 247
(4th Dep't 1991); Mavroudis v. State Wide Ins. Co., 121 A.D.2d 433, 503 N.Y.S.2d 133
(2d Dep't 1986); Kurrus v. CNA Ins. Co., 115 A.D.2d 593, 594, 496 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256 (2d
Dep't 1985).
80. 164 A.D.2d 583, 565 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1st Dep't 1991).
81. Id. at 565, N.Y.S.2d at 781. For a discussion of Roldan and Belco, see Harry H.
Lipsig, Bad-Faith Failure to Settle, N.YL.J., Feb. 28, 1991, at 3.
82. 31 A.D.2d 12, 294 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1st Dep't 1968).
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excess final judgment in the [underlying] case. '83 Although the
term "judgment rule" does not appear within the opinion, Hene-
gan is widely cited 84 as the New York decision that adopted the
judgment rule in theory if not in name, except for the rare cir-
cumstance when the insured is "insolvent before the rendition of
the judgment and, furthermore, [is] discharged in bankruptcy
from paying [it].""8
In accordance with Henegan, the Second Circuit shortly
thereafter in Young v. American Casualty Co., s awarded the
amount of the excess judgment as damages in a bad faith action,
despite the fact that the formerly solvent insured's debt had
been relieved in bankruptcy. 7 In the words of the Young court,
"the fact that [the insured] ha[s] been discharged from future
liability on [the excess] judgment does not inure to the benefit
of [the insurer]." 88
The dissenting opinion in Gordon v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co.89 advocates a retreat from compliance with the
judgment rule in favor of a convoluted three-part rule.90 Under
83. Id. at 13, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
84. See Levantino v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 102 Misc. 2d 77, 83, 422 N.Y.S.2d
995, 1000 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 37 A.D.2d 265, 270, 323
N.Y.S.2d 550, 555 (2d Dep't 1971), reo'd on other grounds, 30 N.Y.2d 427, 285 N.E.2d
849, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972); Young v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 416 F.2d 906,
912 (2d Cir. 1969).
85. Henegan, 31 A.D.2d at 14, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 549 (citing Harris v. Standard Acc. &
Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843 (1962)). In Harris, the
insured was insolvent at the time of the personal injury trial and was forced into bank-
ruptcy after the excess judgment was entered against him. Harris, 297 F.2d at 629. In the
bad faith action that followed, a district court's award of the excess judgment to the
insured's bankruptcy trustee, was reversed on appeal. Id. at 636.
86. 416 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. dismissed, 396 U.S. 997 (1970).
87. Id. at 912.
88. Id. at 908.
89. 30 N.Y.2d 427, 441, 285 N.E.2d 849, 856, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 612, cert. denied,
410 U.S. 942 (1972).
90. Id. at 442, 285 N.E.2d at 857, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 613 (Breitel, J., dissenting). The
trial court in Gordon had charged "that if liability is found the damages are measured as
a matter of law by the amount of the excess judgmentfl." Gordon, 30 N.Y.2d at 442, 285
N.E.2d at 857, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 613 (Breitel, J., dissenting). In Knobloch v. Royal Globe
Ins. Co., 38 N.Y.2d 471, 344 N.E.2d 364, 381 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1976), the excess verdict had
been paid by the insured and a co-defendant prior to institution of the bad faith action,
so upon finding bad faith, the court ordered the insurer to pay -the excess judgment. Id.
at 476, 344 N.E.2d at 367, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 436. In St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v.
United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 977, 375 N.E.2d 733, 404 N.Y.S.2d 552
(1978), the excess verdict had been paid by the excess insurer, so upon finding bad faith,
17
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the proposed rule, the measure of bad faith damages would de-
pend on whether the insured is solvent, insolvent, or impecuni-
ous - "of such meager means that a judgment [would be]
worth less than the full amount of the excess verdict." 91 Judge
Breitel, writing for the three dissenting judges, advocated that
when the insured is either insolvent or impecunious, factors such
as his "age, economic status, economic prospects, skills, health,
and any other matters presently existing which would be reason-
ably predictive of [his] economic future," should influence what
measure of damages is applied once bad faith has been proven.9 2
Thirteen years ago, this approach was embraced by a New
York trial court, and was credited with providing "the only guid-
ance available... [on] how damages should be evaluated where
the assured is judgment proof or impecunious."9 " In Levantino
v. Insurance Co. of North American,9 4 a bad faith claim was in-
stituted after an excess judgment was obtained against an impe-
cunious insured.95 The jury found bad faith liability and
awarded the plaintiff the amount of the excess judgment plus
interest.98 The insurer moved to set aside the verdict after dis-
covering that the insured had filed for bankruptcy before the
bad faith trial.9 7
The Levantino court refused to set aside the verdict, uncon-
vinced that knowledge by the jury of the bankruptcy filing
would have altered the award. 8 The court set forth concisely the
minority three-part rule as follows:
1) where the assured pays part of the judgment or is solvent
the court ordered the primary insurer to reimburse the excess insurer. In Kulak v. Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 47 A.D.2d 418, 366 N.Y.S.2d 927 (4th Dep't 1975), the Fourth
Department followed Gordon, but that decision was reversed on other grounds when it
reached the Court of Appeals. Kulak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.2d 140, 351
N.E.2d 735, 386 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1976).
91. DiBlasi v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 147 A.D.2d 93, 103, 542 N.Y.S.2d 187, 194
(2d Dep't 1989).
92. Gordon, 30 N.Y.2d at 451, 285 N.E.2d at 863, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 620 (Breitel, J.,
dissenting).
93. Levantino v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 102 Misc. 2d 77, 85, 422 N.Y.S.2d 995,
1001 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 78, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
96. Id. at 79, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 88, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
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enough to do so at the time of the excess judgment, the judgment
rule applies and he is entitled to the full amount of the excess as
his damages; 2) where he was insolvent before the judgment and
obtained a bankruptcy discharge after it, he is not damaged and
may not recover for it; and 3) where he was insolvent or nearly
insolvent prior to the judgment the jury must consider his past,
his prospects, and other economic factors and assess his
damages."9
Nevertheless, in accord with the Gordon minority opinion,
the Comment following New York Pattern Jury Instruction 4:67
cites Gordon for the proposition that with regard to bad faith
damages, the judgment rule applies if the insured is solvent.100
When the insured is insolvent or impecunious, PJI 4:67 remarks
that "damages recoverable ... are not clear."10' Thus, while use
of the Gordon dissenters' opinion in a jury charge is recom-
mended by PJI 4:67, it is not acknowledged as being "the law in
New York."102.
Recent case law reveals that such an approach is meeting
with resistance. In DiBlasi v. Aetna Life and Casualty Insur-
ance Co.,10 3 the Second Department appeared to reject the
three-pronged rule and espoused consistent application of the
judgment rule, noting that "[r]egardless of the insured's finan-
cial responsibility most courts automatically adopt the excess
judgment as the measure of damages. '10 4 The DiBlasi court
found support for its ruling in Reifenstein v. Allstate Insurance
Co., 10 5 a case in which the Fourth Department had defined the
99. Id. at 87, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
100. 2 NEw YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIvI 4:67 Comment, at 357
(Supp. 1992). Interest accrues on a tort judgment from the date it is obtained, so the
judgment rule includes interest on the excess judgment. Id. (citing DiBlasi v. Aetna Life
& Cas. Ins. Co., 147 A.D.2d 93, 542 N.Y.S.2d 187 (2d Dep't 1989)).
101. Id.
102. 2 NEw YORK PATERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIviL 4:67 Comment, at 358
(Supp. 1992).
103. 147 A.D.2d 93, 542 N.Y.S.2d 187 (2d Dep't 1989).
104. DiBlasi v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 147 A.D.2d 93, 101, 542 N.Y.S.2d 187, 193
(2d Dep't 1989). The DiBlasi court did admit, however, that the insured was solvent, so
distinctions between solvency, insolvency, and impecuniosity were not in issue. Id. at
103, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
105. 92 A.D.2d 715, 461 N.Y.S.2d 104 (4th Dep't 1983). In Reifenstein, the insurer
initially offered $9,500 of the insured's $10,000 policy limits on a wrongful death liability
claim and refused for ten months to increase the offer to policy limits. Id. at 715, 461
1992]
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bad faith cause of action as one brought by an insured "to re-
cover the excess judgment"1 8 after losing "an actual opportu-
nity to settle the negligence claim against him within the cover-
age limits of his policy by reason of the insurer's purported 'bad
faith.' "L07
In 1990, a Kings County jury in Pavia v. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co. 08 applied the judgment rule in a
bad faith case, ordering State Farm to pay the excess judgment
of $3.7 million."'9 In October 1992, the Second Department af-
firmed the decision of the Supreme Court, Kings County, order-
ing State Farm to pay an excess judgment of 3.7 million dol-
lars.110 On appeal, State Farm had argued that since the
insureds were "insolvent" and unable to pay any significant por-
tion of the underlying personal injury judgment, in effect they
did not sustain any legally compensable damages and thus the
entire judgment should be vacated. The Second Department de-
clined to adopt this view, holding that it "is settled in New York
that with respect to a solvent insured, the measure of damages
in a bad faith case is the amount by which the judgment in the
underlying tort action exceeds the insured's policy coverage." '111
The appellate court found that although the insured's
lacked the resources to pay any significant portion of the judg-
ment, they were not financially "insolvent" to the extent that
they would suffer no harm by virtue of the judgment. In fact,
citing Henegan v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.,11 2 the court adopted
the view that the very imposition of such a large judgment
causes harm to the judgment debtor. "The judgment increases
his debts, it damages his credit, it subjects his property to the
N.Y.S.2d at 105.
106. Reifenstein, 92 A.D.2d at 716, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 106 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Insurer Liable for $3.7 Million Award, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 1990, at 2, col. 5. For a
discussion of Pavia and the question of how long after discovery an insurer can wait to
offer limits before the plaintiff can refuse and pursue bad faith, see Francis J. Scahill,
Bad Faith Litigation: A Window Period on the Horizon, N.Y.S.B.J., Nov. 1991, at 31;
Lipsig, supra note 81, at 3.
109. Insurer Liable, supra note 108.
110. Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Aut. Ins. Co., 183 A.D.2d 189, 589 N.Y.S.2d 510 (2d
Dept. 1992).
111. Id. at 200, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
112. 31 A.D.2d 12, 13, 294 N.Y.S.2d 547, 548 (1st Dep't 1971).
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lien of the ubiquitous judgment."' 13
In addition, from a public policy standpoint, the court re-
fused to permit a "faithless carrier" to "shackle[] its insured
with a massive excess judgment" and avoid liability by arguing
that its "insured's assets have not been sufficiently damaged by
the judgment"."" To adopt such a standard would only serve to
reward an insurer who acts in bad faith, since, in the case of an
"impecunious insured, the carrier's liability in any 'bad faith'
case would be. governed not by the amount of the resulting ex-
cess judgment but rather by the measure of its insured's limited
economic worth." 21
III. New York Should Adopt The Negligence Standard For
Liability And Apply The Judgment Rule As The Measure Of
Damages
A. Reasons for Adopting the Negligence Standard
1. The Insurer is a Fiduciary with Absolute Control over
the Insured's Financial Future
When an insurer handles a liability claim brought against
its insured, the insurer acts as a fiduciary.1 " The insured places
his trust and confidence in the insurer, and relies upon the in-
surer to guard him against financial harm."" "In defending a
claim, an insurer is obligated to act with undivided loyalty; it
may not place its own interests above those of its assured.""' 8
When an offer to settle the case within limits is made, the
insurer has absolute control in deciding whether to accept it or
try the *case, thereby exposing the insured to an excess judg-
113. Pavia, 183 A.D.2d at 201, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 517 (quoting Henegan v. Merchants
Mut. Ins. Co., 31 A.D.2d 12, 13, 294 N.Y.S.2d 547, 548 (1st Dep't 1968).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 92 A.D.2d 337, 340,
462 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (1st Dep't 1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 569, 463 N.E.2d 608, 475
N.Y.S.2d 267 (1984). See also discussion of the fiduciary standard of insurer conduct in
ROBERT F. CUSHMAN ET AL., PROSECUTING AND DEFENDING INSURANCE CLAIMS § 17.9
(1989). But see William T. Barker et al., Is an Insurer a Fiduciary to its Insureds?, 25
TORT & INS. LJ. 1 (1989) (focusing on California law).
117. Murray & Delli Bovi, supra note 8, at 441.
118. Hartford, 92 A.D.2d at 340, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
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ment.119 A conflict of interest 120 arises because while it is always
in the insured's best financial interest to settle the case within
limits, it is in the insurer's financial interest to settle only "when
the relationship between [the] settlement offer and policy limits
is mathematically favorable in the light of the probabilities of
winning or losing the suit.' 2 ' This conflict creates an obligation
on the part of the insurer "to protect the interests of the assured
equally with its own. 1
22
In theory, the insurer should be able to satisfy the obliga-
tion to protect the insured's interests equally with its own. In
practice, however, whether insurers actually do satisfy the obli-
gation is highly debateable. Adopting the negligence standard
for bad faith liability would prompt insurers to be more cogni-
zant of their obligation, and more careful when making choices
on whether to settle. It would force them to think of their in-
sured's interest equally with their own, every step of the way
through settlement negotiations. This rationale was set forth
concisely in Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's v. General Acci-
dent Insurance Company of America,125 in which the court
stated:
When a claim exceeds policy limits, a rational insured, having
purchased protection against liability, would seek to settle ...
within policy limits. Typically, however, the insurer has full con-
trol over . . . the decision to settle. Absent a duty to settle, the
insurer would consider only its monetary interests in deciding
whether... to settle, ignoring the risk of an excess verdict which
would be borne entirely by the insured. The duty of due care...
remedies that situation, forcing the insurer "to view the situation
as if there were no policy limits applicable to the claim, and to
give equal consideration to the financial exposure of the
insured.,124
119. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 263 (Miss. 1988).
120. For a succinct discussion of the conflict of interest situation the insurer as-
sumes under the liability policy, see Dumas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 A.2d
781, 784 (N.H. 1971).
1 121. Hartford, 528 So. 2d at 263 (citing Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 CaL Rptr.
511, 518-19 (1974)).
122. Merritt, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 518-19; Brown v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co.,
314 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1963) (construing New York law).
123. 909 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Indiana law).
124. Id. at 232 (citing Continental Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 862, 864
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Some jurisdictions maintain that when an insurer handles
the defense of a claim brought against its insured, the insured's
interest is not to be considered equally, but instead "must neces-
sarily come first."12 5 Jurisdictions espousing this view believe
that "the interests of the insured are paramount to those of the
insurer, and that the insurer may not gamble with the funds and
resources of its policyholders."""8 An argument for adoption of
the negligence standard for bad faith liability is even more per-
suasive given this reasoning.
2. The Negligence Standard is a Fair Compromise be-
tween a Strict Liability Standard and a Dishonesty
Standard
Although no court to date has held an insurer strictly liable
in bad faith for failure to settle a liability claim within policy
limits, the use of strict liability as an ideal way to balance the
interests of the insured and the insurer has long been advocated
by some jurisdictions.112" "The strongest argument on the side of
strict liability appears to be that [because] the [insured's] inter-
ests generally dictate settlement within the policy limits, the in-
surer having control of settlement should be held to assume the
risks of its acts against the insured's interests." 8
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of West Virginia
recently adopted a "hybrid negligence-strict liability"1 29 stan-
dard for use in future bad faith actions. The impact of the ruling
in that case, Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Insurance CO. 1 0 is
not yet known, but could be vast indeed. In Shamblin, the trial
court had applied a negligence standard and the insurer had
(7th Cir. 1976)).
125. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 264 (Miss. 1988) (citing
Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 419 A.2d 417, 422-23 (N.J. 1980)).
126. Hartford, 528 So. 2d at 265 (citing Cousins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
294 So.2d 272, 275 (La. Ct. App. 1974)). Contra Barker, supra note 118, at 2 (stating that
insurer is required to give only equal, not paramount, consideration to insured's
interests).
127. Scannell, supra note 9, at 385 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins.
Co. of Am., 323 A.2d 495, 509-10 (N.J. 1974) and Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173,
177 (Cal. 1967)).
128. Dumas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 A.2d 781, 784 (N.H. 1971).
129. Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 776 (W. Va. 1990).
130. Id.
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been found liable in bad faith for failure to settle the underlying
tort action brought against its insured.' Nationwide appealed,
arguing that negligence was too lenient a standard for the impo-
sition of bad faith liability.13 2 In reaching its decision, the
Shamblin court analyzed the various standards for bad faith lia-
bility and concluded that not only is the negligence standard ap-
propriate, but it is best applied in conjunction with a strict lia-
bility component. 3 In the words of the court:
"wherever there is a failure on the part of the insurer to settle
within policy limits... [and] there exists the opportunity to so
settle[,] and where such settlement within policy limits would re-
lease the insured from any and all personal liability,.., the in-
surer has prima facie failed to act in its insured's best interest
and ... such failure to so settle prima facie constitutes bad faith
towards its insured."' '
In West Virginia, it is now the insurer's burden to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that it attempted in good faith to
settle; that failure to settle when the opportunity to do so ex-
isted, "was based on reasonable and substantial grounds," and;
that it "accorded the interests and rights of the insured at least
as great a respect as its own."M 5
The strict liability standard has come under fire as one
which might benefit individual insureds, but will more likely
"precipitate an increase in insurance rates and adversely affect
insureds as a group,"' 36 because it arguably "writes unlimited
131. Id. at 771, 773. In the underlying tort action, a woman sued Shamblin after
being struck head-on by a truck Shamblin owned. Two other Shamblin trucks were also
involved in the collision, which occurred when the latter two drivers signaled to the first
that it was clear to pass another truck. Shamblin had $100,000 per person and $300,000
per occurrence bodily injury liability limits. The woman sought $100,000 for each
Shamblin vehicle because she contended all three drivers were negligent. Nationwide
contended the entire accident was a single occurrence so only $100,000 in coverage was
available. The woman offered to settle for whatever the policy limits were judicially de-
termined to be. Nationwide refused and instead offered $100,000 plus $30,000 from
Shamblin's own pocket. The jury awarded the woman $775,000.
132. Id. at 773.
133. Id. at 776.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Scannel, supra note 9, at 377, 397. Scannell believes that the trend toward
strict liability, among other things:
create[s] a significant threat of bad faith liability and recovery in each claim set-
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coverage into every policy that can be settled within its lim-
its."1  Adoption of the negligence standard by New York would
appease critics of the strict liability standard, yet simultaneously
would increase the opportunity for insureds who are victims of
bad faith to transfer the liability for excess judgments to their
insurers without having to overcome the dishonesty standard
hurdle.
3. Combatting the Insurer's Defense that Refusing to Set-
tle was not Bad Faith Because a Liability Argument
Existed
Precedent does exist to support the proposition that when
the insurer has a valid liability argument in the underlying tort
action, it has the right to try that issue before a jury138 without
being subject to a bad faith claim.135 Indeed, New York Insur-
ance Law § 2601, which regulates claim settlement practices, re-
quires insurers to effectuate "settlement[] of claims submitted
in which liability has become reasonably clear."1 40
tlement situation. Conscious of potential bad faith liability and the ensuing award,
and determined to avoid a finding of unreasonableness, an insurer may voluntarily
place a higher value on each claim. This course of action may in turn lead to more
claim settlements and a concomitant increase in the exposure of insurers, because
settlement precludes a determination of no liability. Increased exposure through
settlement, therefore, will cause insurers to increase liability insurance rates.
Id. at 397.
137. Dumas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 A.2d 781, 784 (N.H. 1971).
138. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 43
N.Y.2d 977, 978, 375 N.E.2d 733, 404 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (1978).
139. See DiBlasi v. Aetna Life and Ca. Ins. Co., 147 A.D.2d 93, 98, 542 N.Y.S.2d
187, 191 (2d Dep't 1989) (ruling that "a bad faith case is established where the liability
is clear and the potential recovery far exceeds the insurance coverage") (emphasis
added); Pipoli v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 31 N.Y.2d 679, 289 N.E.2d 178, 337
N.Y.S.2d 257 (1972) (unanimously affirming appellate ruling of no bad faith when in-
surer refused to settle in reliance on insured's version that his car had run out of gas on
the highway and that he had taken "every possible precaution to make its presence
known to the other driver"); Colbert v. Home Indem. Co., 35 A.D.2d 326, 315 N.Y.S.2d
949 (4th Dep't 1970) (affirming dismissal of insured's bad faith complaint because he
claimed not to have been the driver in the single vehicle accident and was thus estopped
from arguing that insurer should have disbelieved him and settled the liability claim
against him); Brown v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 314 F.2d 675, 679 (2d Cir.
1963) (ruling that bad faith is most readily inferable when injuries are so severe that the
verdict is likely to greatly exceed policy limits and when a defendant's verdict on the
issue of liability is doubtful).
140. N.Y. INs. LAW § 2601 (McKinney 1985) (emphasis added).
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Interestingly, however, this statutory language is not identi-
cal to that which appeared in the Governor's Memorandum on
the statute, a proposed bill at the time. The Memorandum re-
marked that the statute would require an insurer to effectuate
"settlement of any claims in which its liability has become rea-
sonably clear. ' 141 Moreover, language describing the statute in a
Joint Legislative Committee Report is altogether different. The
Committee noted that the statute would require insurers to "at-
tempt good faith settlements of claims for which the company is
clearly liable. ' 142 Use of the different language creates confusion
as to the definition of the term "liability" in the statutory
context.
Experts who have analyzed the insurer's liability defense
find it weak. They label it a vague and subjective defense that
yields inconsistent and unpredictable results when applied "to
real-world decisions to accept or reject settlement offers. 43 As
one distinguished commentator has noted, the insurer's argu-
ment that it can refuse to settle without fear of bad faith when
it has a reasonable liability defense "suffer[s] from two main
flaws"144 and states: "Does a 'fair and reasonable' prospect of
success [on liability] mean a 51 percent chance of victory? A 75
percent chance? A 90 percent chance? Second, [the liability de-
fense] focus[es] too much attention on one of the two factors
that normally affect a decision to accept or reject a settlement
offer. [It] place[s] all of [its] emphasis on the probability of win-
ning and give[s] little weight to the amount the third party
might recover if he wins his suit against the insured."'14"
Indeed, when the accident victim's injury is severe and the
special damages alone approach or exceed policy limits, the logic
of the liability defense becomes strained. At times, the probable
damages are so far above limits that even a finding of minimal
negligence on the insured will result in an excess verdict. Pre-
serving the logic of the liability defense in such cases is unwise,
141. NEw YORK STATE LEGISLATm ANNUAL 305 (New York Legislative Service, Inc.
1970).
142. IV NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE DocuMENT SERIES, 1919-1976, No. 18, Joint Legisla-
tive Committee on Consumer Protection (5th annual report, March 31, 1970).
143. ASHLEY, supra note 15, at 33-34.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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both to those who have suffered catastrophic injuries and are
being vastly undercompensated, and to the public who will likely
be forced to bear the burden of care for the victim because he
can no longer care for himself. At least one court faced with such
a case has warned that even though an insurer believes it has "a
genuine and reasonable issue as to its insured's liability," it can-
not rely on this factor alone when deciding whether to settle. 46
According to the West Virginia Supreme Court in that case,
Shamblin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., "if the settle-
ment offer can be considered fair when cast against the possibil-
ity of a substantial excess verdict against the insured, the liabil-
ity issue in and of itself may not be sufficient grounds for the
insurer not to settle. '147
Other commentators endorse the imposition of bad faith in
cases of contested liability by referring to it as the price to pay
for "ferreting out nonmeritorious claims. 11 48 They reason that
paying nonmeritorious claims, in which significant liability is-
sues exist, drive up insurance rates for everyone. 149 The better
approach, it is argued, is to contest liability, but also to impose
bad faith liability when claims are ultimately determined to be
meritorious, as a simple expense of engaging in the business of
insuring for risks. 50 The risk involved "is simply that an [in-
surer] may erroneously regard a meritorious claim as a nonmeri-
torious claim and thereby subject its insured to a liability in ex-
cess of the policy limits. In that event, the insurance company
merely satisfies the entire judgment, even though it exceeds the
policy, as an incidental cost of the insurance business."1 '
146. Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 776 (W. Va. 1990).
147. Id. at 777.
148. Murray & Delli Bovi, supra note 9, at 444.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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B. Reasons for Applying the Judgment Rule Regardless of the
Insured's Solvency
1. Insurer Owes all Insureds the Same Duty to Settle
Claims in Good Faith
The wealth or poverty of an insured is a poor measure of an
insurer's duty.15 2 All insureds, regardless of wealth, are entitled
to protection by insurers handling liability claims brought
against them. An insurer with an insolvent insured should not
be excused "from exercising the same good faith it would be ex-
pected to exercise, were the insured" solvent and capable of pay-
ing an excess judgment. 115 Moreover, because the size of the ex-
cess verdict is not a function of the insured's economic status, it
seems illogical to condition the payment of the judgment on his
economic status.
The insurer's conduct may well have contributed to the in-
sured's weakened financial condition.1 Therefore, especially in
such instances, the insurer should be prohibited from capitaliz-
ing on the insured's financial frailty.155 The insurer should be
held responsible for the excess judgment regardless of the full-
ness or emptiness of the insured's purse.156 Any other rule for
measuring damages results in a windfall to insurers fortunate
enough to insure impoverished individuals.1 57
152. Bourget v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 456 F.2d 282, 289 (2d Cir. 1972)
(Oakes, J., dissenting).
153. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Schropp, 567 P.2d 1359, 1369 (Kan. 1977).
154. Purdy v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 532 (Cal. App. 1984). See,
e.g., State Farm v. Schlossberg, 570 A.2d 328, 329 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 577
A.2d 50 (Md. 1990), (insured filed for bankruptcy because he was unable to pay the
excess judgment); Young v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 416 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 99 (1970) (ruling that insured's paying part of excess judg-
ment and filing bankruptcy will not inure to the benefit of the insurer).
155. Id.
156. Carter v. Pioneer Mut. Cas. Co., 423 N.E.2d 188, 191 (Ohio 1981) (citing
Wolfberg v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 240 N.E.2d 176, 176 (III. App. Ct. 1968)).
157. Dumas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 A.2d 781, 782 (N.H. 1971), over-
ruling Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 26 A.2d 361 (N.H. 1942).
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2. Application of the Judgment Rule Promotes Improved
Claims Handling
Application of the judgment rule not only protects insureds
but "promot[es] good faith in the conduct of settlement negotia-
tions by a liability insurer" and fosters "the prompt and fair dis-
position of liability claims."1 58 Rejecting the judgment rule
"opens the door [for insurers to use] the shaky financial condi-
tion of an insured as a device for driving down settlements"1 59
and encourages them to unreasonably refuse to settle, e10 playing
"fast and loose with claims against their less affluent policyhold-
ers."1 61 Even Judge Breitel, the author of the infamous Gordon
dissent advocating the three-part bad faith damages rule, ac-
knowledged that "most courts automatically adopt the excess
judgment as the measure of damages ... [because] [tlo permit
otherwise... would allow insurers to benefit from the impecuni-
ousness of an insured [and] encourage insurers to be less respon-
sive to their contractual obligations .... .162
3. Insurer Should be Held to the Terms of its Policy
Liability policies commonly include language that states
"[b]ankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or of the insured's
estate shall not relieve the Company of any of its obligations
hereunder."163 Courts have construed the term "obligations"
comprehensively, finding that it refers not only to the maximum
dollar amount of the policy liability limits, but also to other obli-
gations of the insurer.1 4 Thus, the insurer is barred from using
the insured's insolvency as a defense against any of its obliga-
158. Bourget v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 456 F.2d 282, 288 (2d Cir. 1972)
(Oakes, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 288 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
160. Carter, 423 N.E.2d at 191 (quoting Wolfberg v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 240
N.E.2d 176, 176 (I1. App. 1968)).
161. Moutsopoulos v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 1185, 1189-90 (7th Cir. 1979)
(citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475, 485 (5th Cir. 1969)). In Moutso-
poulos, the Seventh Circuit ruled, pursuant to Wisconsin law, that damages in a bad
faith case are equal to the amount of the excess judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 1186.
162. Gordon, 30 N.Y.2d at 448-49, 285 N.E.2d at 861, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 618-19 (Brei-
tel, J., dissenting).
163. Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 563 (Mo. App. 1990).
164. Id. at 563 (relying on Maguire v. Allstate Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 866 (D. DeL
1972)).
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tions, including those that flow from its bad faith conduct.165
Because liability policies are contracts of adhesion, written
solely by the insurer, questions with regard to the meaning of
policy language must be resolved in favor of the insured.166
Therefore, courts should not accept an insurer's argument that
the term "obligation" refers only to the maximum amount of the
liability policy limits, because such reference "is not apparent
from the language employed. 1 61 7 If a narrow meaning of the
term had been intended, the insurer should have used specific
language to make the intention "clearly known"168 and to pro-
tect itself against allegations of ambiguity.
Even policies that do not include the above-mentioned
clause usually do contain a clause that says the insurer "will pay
damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any
covered person becomes legally responsible because of an [] ac-
cident." 69 Whether an insured intends, or is financially capable
of paying a judgment, does not affect his legal responsibility for
it. Thus, based on a fair reading of the policy language, the in-
surer is required to cover the excess judgment as bad faith dam-
ages, regardless of the insured's solvency, because the insured is
legally liable for that judgment.
4. Even an Insolvent Insured is Damaged by an Excess
Judgment
An insured without assets "suffers injury when an excess
judgment is obtained against him because [it will] potentially
impair his credit, place a cloud on the title to his exempt estate,
impair his ability to successfully apply for loans, diminish his
reputation and future prospects, and the like." 7' Indeed, ac-
165. Id.
166. Ruder & Finn Inc. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 52 N.Y.2d 663, 671, 422 N.E.2d 518,
522, 439 N.Y.S.2d 858, 862 (1981).
167. Miller v. Continental Ins. Co., 40 N.Y.2d 675, 677, 358 N.E.2d 258, 260, 389
N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 (1976) (construing word "accident" in life insurance policy).
168. Sperling v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 7 N.Y.2d 442, 447, 166 N.E.2d 482, 485, 199
N.Y.S.2d 465, 469 (1960).
169. Gray v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1128, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
170. Carter v. Pioneer Mut. Ins. Co., 423 N.E.2d 188, 191 (Ohio 1981). For a succinct
discussion of bad faith damages sustained by insolvent insureds, see Dumas v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 A.2d 781, 782-83 (N.H. 1971). In Dumas, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court overruled a 25-year-old precedent and authorized insureds to bring
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cording to Judge Breitel, author of the Gordon dissent, there
may be "other tangible harms, such as the loss of the right to
operate motor vehicles or to obtain employment or
insurance.
1 1
71
Unpaid judgments have long been recognized to qualify as
damages in a bad faith case.17 2 Thirty-one years ago, for in-
stance, the Fourth Circuit in Lee v. Nationwide Mutual Insur-
ance Co.,173 accepted the view that unpaid judgments are inju-
ries in themselves, and should be the measure of damages in a
bad faith case.P7 4 In adopting this view, the court analogized un-
paid judgments and unpaid medical expenses:
It would be the clearest kind of error for a... court to instruct a
jury that they could not consider the element of damage consist-
ing of medical, nursing and hospital expenses which had been in-
curred by the plaintiff but not paid.... IT]he analogy between
that element of damage in a bodily injury suit, on the one hand,
and the element of damage to the plaintiffs here, through suffer-
ing or 'incurring' this judgment, on the other hand, is so close as
to be indistinguishable .... 15
Even when the excess judgment is discharged in bank-
ruptcy, insurers who argue that insureds are not economically
damaged ignore the negative impact that discharge has on the
insured's "future financial dealings."17 Indeed, "the submission
to bankruptcy to avoid the excess judgment may be a significant
loss for those who are sensitive or for those who have a reasona-
bad faith claims without prior payment of the excess judgment or proof of the ability to
pay it. Id. at 783. See also Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 286 F.2d 295, 295 (4th Cir.
1961) ("even insolvent, the outstanding judgments, as constant and life-long threats to
[the insured's] financial security and rating .... caused him almost immeasurable
damages").
171. Gordon, 30 N.Y.2d at 451, 285 N.E.2d at 863, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 621 (Breitel, J.,
dissenting).
172. Wolfberg v. Prudence Mutual Cas. Co. of Chicago, 240 N.E.2d 176, 180 (IEl.
App. 1968). According to the court in Wolfberg, "[tihe rule of damages is that incurrence
is equivalent to outlay." Id. Thus, "the very fact of the entry of judgment itself consti-
tutes damage and harm sufficient to permit recovery." Id. "[T]he proposition that the
[insured's] assets [are] relevant or material has been specifically rejected." Id.
173. 286 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1961).
174. Id. at 298.
175. Id. (quoting Wessing v. American Indem. Co., 127 F. Supp. 775, 781 (D.C.W.D.
Mo. 1955)).
176. Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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ble likelihood of ever requiring credit. 117
5. The Public Interest in Spreading the Burden of Care
"[A] strong public interest [exists] in spreading the burden
of caring for the injured. 178 Our society has found it "desirable
to utilize insurance as a means" to spread this burden, especially
when the injured party is a victim of negligence.1 7 9
When a negligence victim is injured catastrophically, to the
point of requiring institutionalization, the need for spreading
the burden of care is underscored. The cost of private institu-
tionalized care rises significantly each year. Juries in negligence
cases are free to award damages to cover the cost of private fa-
cility care as opposed to less expensive public facility care. Yet
insurers sued for bad faith by insureds facing sizeable excess
judgments argue that the judgments are inflated by private care
cost figures. Insurers would prefer to use the public care cost
figures.
Catastrophically injured victims should have the choice of
where to obtain institutionalized care. Once a jury has assessed
damages and an excess judgment is obtained against the insured,
recovery of the excess judgment as damages in the subsequent
bad faith action should not hinge on the insurer's argument that
the medical expenses are inflated. It would be an injustice to
force someone injured negligently by another to seek care at a
public facility instead of a private facility merely because the
insurer found in bad faith does not want to pay the full excess
judgment. Moreover, it would be unfair to citizens to use public
funds to support the incapacitated victim,180 when the burden
should rest on the bad faith insurer.
177. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 460, 285 N.E.2d 849, 862
N.Y.S.2d 601, 620 (1972) (Breitel, J., dissenting). Of course, declaration of bankruptcy
prior to the tort trial is distinguishable from declaration afterwards. See, e.g., Camp v.
St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 127 B.R. 879 (N.D. Fla. 1991) (relieving insurer of
potential liability for bad faith failure to settle where insured doctor's debts were dis-
charged in bankruptcy prior to his medical malpractice trial).
178. Bourget v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 456 F.2d 282, 288 (2d Cir. 1972)
(Oakes, J., dissenting).
179. Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law
Problems, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 357 (1960).
180. Note, supra note 179, at 379.
[Vol. 12:543
32https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/2
19921 NEW YORK THIRD PARTY BAD FAITH
6. Judgment Rule Without Regard to Solvency is not Ex-
cessive: Many States Award Additional Compensatory
and Punitive Damages
Unlike most states, which view a breach of the implied cove-
nant to settle claims in good faith as a tort 81 as well as a breach
of contract,8 2 New York views it as the latter only.83 Damages
awarded in breach of contract cases are compensatory in nature.
Plaintiffs in jurisdictions that label bad faith a tort and a breach
of contract, however, have a wider range of damages available to
them,1 8' including consequential damages,8' damages for mental
anguish, 88 and in some cases, punitive damages.187
181. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 203 (Cal. 1958) (holding
that breach of the good faith covenant to settle claims "sounds in both contract and
tort"). For a discussion of Comunale, see Croskey, supra note 34, at 563.
182. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance and its enforcement." Kenneth E. Keller et al., Emerging Trends in
Non-Insurance Bad Faith Litigation, in BAD FArrH LTGATION AND INSURER VS. INSURER
DIsPUTEs 1989 219, 222 (Practicing Law Institute 1989) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)).
183. Gordon, 30 N.Y.2d at 437, 285 N.E.2d at 854, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 608-09. See also
DiBlasi, 147 A.D.2d at 101, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 193 (stating "[t]he contractual, rather than
tortious, foundation of a bad faith case was discussed in Gordon"). Contra Harris v.
Standard Acc. and Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 627, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
843 (1962), in which Judge Lumbard considered the bad faith action to be a tort.
184. ROBERT H. JERRY HI. UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 120 (1987). According to
the Second Department, "no appellate decision in New York [] has affirmed... any
damages other than the amount of the judgment in the underlying action in excess of the
policy limits, plus interest." DiBlasi v. Aetna Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 147 A.D.2d 93, 100,
542 N.Y.S.2d 187, 192 (2d Dep't 1989).
185. For a discussion of consequential damages that can be awarded for the breach
of an insurance contract, see Bob G. Freemon, Jr., Reasonable and Foreseeable Damages
for Breach of an Insurance Contract, 21 TORT & INs. L.J. 108 (1986).
186. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967) (allowing recovery for
emotional distress damages); contra DiBlasi v. Aetna Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 147 A.D.2d
93, 542 N.Y.S.2d 187 (2d Dep't 1989) (noting that no New York authority exists for
awarding emotional distress damages in a bad faith case, and declining to extend the law
to do so).
187. Jerry, supra note 184, at 120 (1987). Contra Roldan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 149
A.D.2d 20, 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d 359, 374 (2d Dep't 1989) (striking cause of action for puni-
tive damages in bad faith claim); AFIA v. Continental Ins. Co., 140 A.D.2d 167, 168, 527
N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (1st Dep't 1988) (finding no authority in New York "for the thesis that
an allegation of bad faith by an insurer in failing to settle, without more, gives rise to a
claim for punitive damages"); Kulak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 47 A.D.2d 418, 421,
366 N.Y.S.2d 927, 929-30 (4th Dep't 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 140, 351
N.E.2d 735, 386 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1976) (ruling that trial court had erred in permitting the
jury to award punitive damages without evidence that insurer had acted with malice or
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In Massachusetts, where a bad faith cause of action may be
based upon a violation of that state's unfair claim settlement
practices act, one award rendered by the state supreme court
consisted of twice the amount of the excess judgment plus inter-
est, costs, and attorney's fees.188 Thus, application of the judg-
ment rule in all cases is actually a conservative approach to
damages, when one considers the host of damages in addition to
the excess judgment that are awarded in some jurisdictions.
7. Accident Victims Must be Fairly Compensated
An accident victim is "entitled to recover, as nearly as possi-
ble, compensation for the damages he suffers." 189 Depriving in-
sureds of adequate compensation for bad faith damages simulta-
neously deprives accident victims of adequate compensation for
their damages. Application of the Gordon solvency rule would
deprive an accident victim of any real possibility of collecting on
his judgment in instances when the insured happens to be insol-
vent or impecunious. Even critics of extra-contractual bad faith
damages such as punitive damages and emotional suffering dam-
ages admit that liability for the amount of the excess judgment
is fair compensation for insureds,1 90 and thus is fair compensa-
tion for accident victims.
intent to harm the insured). But see Belco Petroleum Corp. v. AIG Oil Rig, Inc., 164
A.D.2d 583, 587, 565 N.Y.S.2d 776, 780 (1st Dep't 1991), on subsequent appeal, 579
N.Y.S.2d 24, 179 A.D.2d 516 (1st Dep't 1992) (rejecting Roldan and finding that New
York Insurance Law § 2601 does not abolish the common law right to seek punitive
damages for bad faith); Jolicouer v. American Transit Ins. Co., 159 A.D.2d 236, 237, 552
N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (1st Dep't 1990) (affirming denial of summary judgment when ques-
tion of fact existed as to whether bad faith "constituted a criminal indifference to civil
obligations warranting punitive damages").
188. DiMarzo v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 449 N.E.2d 1189, 1202 (Mass. 1983)
(awarding $20,000 policy limits plus interest with costs, $129,068 plus interest, doubled,
$2,392 in costs, and $71,962 in attorney's fees, in case where excess judgment had been
$149,068). Chief Judge Hennessey, who concurred in the opinion, remarked regretfully
that the award was "anti-consumer" because the accident victim recovered almost four
times the amount of the excess judgment, at the expense of other consumers insured by
the defendant mutual insurance company. Id. at 1204 (Hennessey, C.J., concurring). A
mutual insurance company is "organized as an association; its members are the insureds
who purchase the association's policies. Historically, if a mutual company made a profit
or suffered a loss, that profit or loss belonged to or was borne by the members ... 
ASHLEY, supra note 5, at § 1:04.
189. Hernandez v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 464 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. 1971).
190. Scannell, supra note 9, at 379, 398.
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Judge Breitel, in his Gordon dissent, cautions that situa-
tions exist in which the "magnitude of the [bad faith] excess
judgment may be so great as to make unjust [the imposition of]
liability up to its full amount." 191 Judge Breitel was apparently
referring to the possibility that some bad faith verdicts will be
too large to expect the insurer to cover. He omitted mention,
however, of the appellate division's power to reduce bad faith
verdicts it finds excessive. 192 If the verdict is left intact on ap-
peal, no reason exists why the judgment rule should not be
applied.
8. The Three-Part Rule Proposed in the Gordon Dissent
is Complex and Impossible to Apply Fairly
Imposition of the Gordon dissent's three-part rule for bad
faith damages is impractical. Jury trials, evidence, and charges
are difficult enough for lay persons to fully comprehend without
being assaulted by all of the variations that the three-part doc-
trine would require to be considered.
IV. Conclusion
New York should adopt the negligence standard for bad
faith liability and the judgment rule for bad faith damages, re-
gardless of the insured's solvency. In lieu thereof, the state legis-
lature should improve the regulation of the insurance industry
so that the public is protected. Legislation that would provide
for these standards would be most helpful. Significantly, how-
ever, it should be recalled that the Appellate Division, Second
Department recently adopted the judgment rule for measure of
bad faith damages in Pavia v. State Mut. Auto Ins. Co.19 3
191. Gordon, 30 N.Y.2d at 427, 285 N.E.2d at 844, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 620 (Breitel, J.,
dissenting).
192. See, e.g., Grimaldi v. Finch, 99 A.D.2d 920, 922, 473 N.Y.S.2d 45, 47 (3d Dep't
1984) (stating that appellate division has "discretionary power to overturn a jury verdict
upon the ground that it is inadequate or excessive... where [it] is so disproportionate as
to shock the conscience of the court."); Jandt v. Abele, 116 A.D.2d 699, 498 N.Y.S.2d 17
(2d Dep't 1986) (finding verdict excessive and granting new trial on issue of damages
unless plaintiff consented to reduction in damages from $100,000 to $65,000).
193. See discussion supra notes 110-15.
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